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Plague, caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, is one of the deadliest infec-
tious diseases in human history, and still causes worrying outbreaks in Africa
and South America. Despite the historical and current importance of plague,
several questions remain unanswered concerning its transmission routes and
infection risk factors. The plague outbreak that started in September 1665 in
the Derbyshire village of Eyam claimed 257 lives over 14 months, wiping out
entire families. Since previous attempts at modelling the Eyam plague, new
data have been unearthed from parish records revealing a much more
complete record of the disease. Using a stochastic compartmental model
and Bayesian analytical methods, we found that both rodent-to-human and
human-to-human transmission played an important role in spreading the
infection, and that they accounted, respectively, for a quarter and three-
quarters of all infections, with a statistically significant seasonality effect.
We also found that the force of infection was stronger for infectious individ-
uals living in the same household compared with the rest of the village.
Poverty significantly increased the risk of disease, whereas adulthood
decreased the risk. These results on the Eyam outbreak contribute to the
current debate on the relative importance of plague transmission routes.1. Introduction
Plague, caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, has been one of the most deadly
infectious diseases throughout human existence. Historically, the term has been
used to refer to many human calamities, and the bacterium has been implicated
in three worldwide pandemics [1,2]. The Justinian Plague of 541–767 is thought
to have killed 40–50% of the population and contributed to the decline and fall
of the Roman Empire [3,4]. In the fourteenth century, the Black Death ravaged
Europe, reportedly killing 25 million people [5]. The third pandemic started in
the mid-nineteenth century and lasted a century, focusing mostly on China and
India, but spreading also to other continents [1,2]. The once debated question of
the causative agent of the Black Death has been confirmed beyond doubt by the
identification of Y. pestis DNA from victim remains [6–8], and likewise for the
Justinian Plague [9,10].
Despite the commonly held view of plague as a historical disease, the bacter-
ium is still present in wild animal reservoirs around the world, and human cases
are frequently reported in African and South American countries [11–13].
Yersinia pestis is considered to be a potential bioterrorism agent [14,15], and
indeed the first recorded use of a biological weapon was during the siege of
Caffa in 1346 when the Mongol army catapulted plague-infected corpses over
the Crimean city’s walls [16]. Public health concern is further increased by
sporadic reports of antimicrobial resistance in Y. pestis [17,18].
Plague is a zoonosis, primarily found in rodents, although most mammals
can be infected [19]. Transmission of Y. pestis to humans can occur through con-
tact with infected animals and their parasites. The oriental rat flea, Xenopsylla
cheopis, is known to be a very effective vector of plague: upon infection its diges-
tive system becomes ‘blocked’, causing vomiting of bacteria into subsequent
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mission has long been considered the main route of
infection. However, human-to-human transmission may be
more important than previously thought, via ectoparasites
such as lice [20] and the human flea Pulex irritans [21]. Yersi-
nia pestis was recently found in human fleas collected from
plague-affected villages of Tanzania and Madagascar
[22,23]. Human fleas do not become blocked in the way rat
fleas do, but unblocked fleas are also able to transmit the
infection [24]. Interhuman transmission of plague can also
occur directly via aerosols following the development of pneu-
monia [25]. Pneumonic plague is known to progress more
quickly and is more frequently fatal, but transmission via this
route is thought to be incompatible with historical accounts of
the plague [26,27].
The plague outbreak that lasted from September 1665 until
October 1666 in the Derbyshire village of Eyam is infamous,
not only for its high death toll, but also due to the heroism
of the villagers who endured a quarantine and successfully
prevented the spread of the disease to neighbouring parishes
[28–31]. Historically, the introduction of the cordon sanitaire
has been considered remarkable, foremost as an act of altruism
by the villagers under the direction of the rector William
Mompesson and previous incumbent Thomas Stanley, and
further because similar contemporary public health measures
were unpopular and often disobeyed [32]. The narrative of
human tragedy that attaches itself to Eyam is heightened by
the suggestion that the quarantine itself prolonged the epi-
demic and exacerbated the human death toll [30,32].
Furthermore, revisionist historians have questioned whether
the quarantine was truly a self-imposed sacrifice, suggesting
that the Earl of Devonshire’s agreement to furnish provisions
may have been tied to the closure of the village [33].
The Eyam outbreak has accordingly been an often-
mentioned epidemiological case study, and the village itself a
popular tourist attraction. However, there have only been a
few attempts to model the epidemiology of the Eyam plague
[34–36]. These previous studies have relied on local historian
William Wood’s account of the village’s demography, who,
writing about a century after the event, placed the population
at around 350 people and the mortality rate at close to 75% [28].
This figure has been disputed based on parish records and
hearth tax returns, suggesting a parish population between
850 and 1000 people [37]. This higher estimate would be com-
patible with an estimate of 750 adults in 1676 [38] and the lack
of long-term demographic effect on the Eyam population [39].
A full transcript of the Eyam parish register between 1630 and
1700 [40] combined with the 1664 Eyam hearth tax return has
revealed the history of the survivors, leading to a conservative
estimate of about 700 people for the population of Eyam at the
start of the outbreak [31].
The first proposed model of the Eyam plague [34,35] is a
typical example of the susceptible–infectious–removed (SIR)
compartmental model and is often mentioned as a case study
[41,42]. Infection was assumed to be transmitted directly
from human to human and to last exactly 11 days before
death. Only the second half of the outbreak was studied,
because the SIR model could not explain the first phase. The
use of a model that ignores the zoonotic nature of the disease
altogether has been noted [27,43], and other acknowledged
shortfalls of the model include the exclusion of a latency
period between catching plague and becoming infectious
and the assumption of perfect mixing between villagers.By contrast, a complex compartmental model with 38 set par-
ameters has more recently been proposed [36], which
considered human, rat and flea population dynamics, but
assumed perfect mixing of a population with an underesti-
mated size of 350 people [28] and no latent period of infection.
The lack of reliable data on parasites and rodent popu-
lation dynamics in seventeenth-century England lead us to
adopt a more parameter-efficient model. We propose a
stochastic compartmental model, considering both rodent-
to-human and human-to-human transmission of plague,
that incorporates a latent period of infection and allows for
an increased rate of human-to-human transmission among
members of the same household. An epidemiological Baye-
sian approach [44] is taken, and the lack of data on infection
times and when plague victims became infectious is
approached using data augmentation techniques [45]. This
allows estimation of the parameters of our model, the relative
importance of transmission routes, the role of the household
structure and the risk factors of infection. The combination
of more detailed data with a novel model, enables us to
shed new light on the transmission of the Eyam plague
outbreak of 1665–1666, which feeds directly into the debate
surrounding the epidemiology of historical plague.2. Results
(a) Data collection and summary
The Reverend William Mompesson, who was the rector of
Eyam at the time of the plague, recorded in the Eyam parish
register the names of all victims of the plague and their
dates of burial from the first case on 6 September 1665 to the
last on 1 November 1666. Although the initial population of
Eyam was originally thought to be around only 350 [28], it
has since been suspected that the total may in fact be signifi-
cantly higher [37]. The publication of a meticulously curated
version of the Eyam parish register between 1630 and 1700
has confirmed that the initial population was around 700
people [31,39,40]. The register records the gender, date of bap-
tism and date of burial. The register further provides an
indicator of whether each death was from plague or other
causes, as marked by a later rector, Joseph Hunt, who copied
the entire text in the latter half of the seventeenth century.
The hearth tax record for Eyam in 1664 includes details of
both taxed and untaxed households, and this was combined
with the Eyam parish register to reconstruct the household
structure for all persons living in the parish during the time
of the plague [31]. The Eyam Museum provides this collated
data, aswell as additional information such as the approximate
year of birth where the exact date of baptism is unknown, and
the year of last mention in records (for example, as the benefi-
ciary of a will, a marriage certificate or the birth of a child)
where the exact date of death is unknown [46]. All of these
data were checked for consistency with the parish register
[40] and digitalized to produce the dataset analysed here,
which is contained in electronic supplementary material,
table S1.
(b) Exploratory data analysis
Of the 700 people reasonably assumed to have been living in
Eyam at the outbreak of plague, 11 are recorded as having
died due to causes other than plague during the epidemic, and
Table 1. Exploratory analysis of the Eyam data using Fisher’s exact tests.
quality of interest factor level plague victims survivors total p-value signiﬁcance
gender male
female
unknown
133
122
2
211
221
—
344
343
2
0.1308 n.s.
hearth tax taxed
untaxed
52
205
149
283
201
488
,0.0001 extremely
age under 18
over 18
unknown
116
126
15
160
258
14
276
384
29
0.0136 weakly
prior infection in household true
false
154
103
102
330
256
433
,0.0001 extremely
0
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Figure 1. Eyam epidemic plot assuming an 11-day infection period. (a) Green line shows susceptible population; orange line shows infected population and red line
shows number of deceased. (b) Each coloured line represents the number of infected people in a household. (Online version in colour.)
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plague are also excluded from the analysis. This leaves a total
population of N¼ 689 people at risk, divided between M¼
210 households. Out of this total, 257 people died of plague
(37%) and 432 (63%) survived it. It is assumed that death from
plague occurred on the day prior to recorded burial.
The data were summarized, and Fisher’s exact tests were
performed to ascertain whether gender, wealth and prior
infection in the same household were significant factors in
describing the epidemic (table 1). This exploratory analysis
showed that household structure and the relative wealth of
households were probably important determinants of the epi-
demic; however, gender was not found to be a significant
factor, in agreement with past studies of Eyam [32,37,39].
The progression of the epidemic was plotted over time by
inferring the number of susceptible and infected villagers
using the naive assumption of a fixed 11-day infection period
before death, as employed in previous modelling studies [34]
(figure 1). Considering the inferred number of infected mem-
bers at any time-point in each household, the household
structure of infection suggested in the exploratory data analysis
is evident (figure 1). The epidemic can be described as being
made of three periods: the initial peak in October 1665,followed by a period of relative abatement over the winter,
during which only a handful of plague infections occurred in
each month, before the onset of a second, more deadly phase
from June 1666 until the last death in October 1666.(c) Informal description of transmission model
In order to investigate the routes of plague transmission in the
Eyam outbreak, we created a purpose-built stochastic epide-
miological model based on the results of the exploratory data
analysis above. A closed population was assumed due to the
effect of the quarantine and the exclusion of deaths from
other causes and births during the outbreak. There is evidence
that in some cases the quarantine was broken, notably by the
Reverend Mompesson, whose children were sent away to
safety in Yorkshire [28]. Additionally, it has been suggested
that one of the reasons for the reduced death toll among
wealthy families could be due to their having fled the area
[33]. Only three cases of recovery from plague in Eyam are
mentioned in the oral history, and none are recorded in the pri-
mary data sources [30]. As such, in accordance with previous
studies, no recovery is allowed for in themodel [34]. A separate
analysis in which we considered that these three individuals
Table 2. Posterior mean, standard deviation (s.d.) and 95% credibility interval (CI) for model parameters under hypothesis bH ¼ bV ¼ 0, hypothesis bH ¼ 0
and under the full model.
bH 5 bV5 0 bH 5 0 full model
Q mean 95% CI s.d. mean 95% CI s.d. mean 95% CI s.d.
bH — — — — — — 16.10 [10.53, 22.52] 3.06
bV — — — 0.33 [0.27, 0.40] 0.03 0.29 [0.23, 0.35] 0.03
103bR 0.96 [0.84, 1.07] 0.06 0.34 [0.25, 0.45] 0.05 0.31 [0.23, 0.41] 0.05
a 0.18 [0.16, 0.20] 0.01 0.18 [0.15, 0.20] 0.01 0.18 [0.16, 0.21] 0.01
g 0.38 [0.33, 0.43] 0.03 0.41 [0.36, 0.47] 0.03 0.41 [0.35, 0.47] 0.03
S
susceptible
Sh(t)
susceptible
in house h
Ih(t)
infectious
in house h
I(t) – Ih(t)
infectious
in village
infectious
rats
bHIh(t) + bVI(t) + bR (bH + bV)/N
bV/N
bR
E
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I
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R
deceased
Y
N
a
(a) (b)
Figure 2. (a) Flow diagram of model compartments with rates of transition between infection states for an individual in house h. (b) Diagram showing routes of
plague transmission to a susceptible individual in house h. (Online version in colour.)
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oral tradition resulted in estimates for the transmission par-
ameters that were not significantly different from the ones we
inferred when no recovery was allowed.
Our model accounts for the possibility of both rodent-to-
human and human-to-human transmission, as well as the
known household structure [47]. Briefly, individuals are
initially susceptible (S), become exposed (E), infectious (I)
and finally removed through death (R) (SEIR model;
figure 2a). Infection (transition from state S to E) happens
through exposure from infected rodents, from other infected
individuals in the household or elsewhere in the village
(figure 2b). The five parameters of this model are thus the
rate bR of rodent-to-human transmission, the rate bV/N of
transmission between humans who are not in the same
household, the additional rate bH/N of transmission within
households, the rate a at which infected individuals become
infectious (transition from state E to I), and finally, the rate g
at which infectious individuals are removed (transition from
state I to R). For a more detailed and formal description of
the model, see the Material and methods section.
(d) Analysis of transmission routes
Bayesian inference of the model parameters was performed
using a Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) algorithm. Data
augmentation techniques [45] were used to account for the
uncertainty in the time at which individuals became infectedand infectious. Visual inspection of the trace plot and the
prior and posterior densities of each parameter indicated
good convergence and mixing (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1), which was confirmed by the fact that
when comparing independent runs the Gelman–Rubin statistic
[48] was less than 1.1 for all parameters. For all parameters,
informative posterior densities were obtained, despite the use
of uninformative priors uniform from 0 to 100. Table 2 presents
the posterior means, standard deviations and 95% credibility
intervals for all model parameters. The latent phase of infection
(state E in our model) was estimated to last on average 1/a ¼
5.6 days (95% credibility interval: [4.8, 6.3]) and the infectious
phase (state I in our model) had a mean duration of 1/g ¼ 2.4
days (95% credibility interval: [2.1, 2.9]).
A similar analysis was also performed assuming that trans-
mission of plague did not occur from human to human (i.e.
bV ¼ 0 and bH ¼ 0), but this hypothesis was decisively rejected
by Bayesian model comparison using a reversible jumpMCMC
[49,50] (Bayes factor greater than 1010). The alternative hypoth-
esis inwhich human-to-human transmission does happenbut is
not more frequent within households (i.e. bV. 0 and bH¼ 0)
was also decisively rejected (Bayes factor greater than 1010).
There is therefore conclusive evidence that human-to-human
transmission played a role in the Eyam plague epidemic, and
that the proximity of sharing a household increased trans-
mission, which justifies the use of our model incorporating
human-to-human transmission and household structure.
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Figure 3. Probability that infection is caused by rodent-to-human transmission, with the shaded area representing the 99.5% credibility interval from 10 000 MCMC
iterations. (Online version in colour.)
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rodent-to-human transmission versus human-to-human trans-
mission was calculated, as well as the expected proportion of
human-to-human transmission events that occurred inside
the household as opposed to from the village at large (electronic
supplementary material, figure S2). The model suggests that
73.0% of infections came from human-to-human transmission
(95% credibility interval: [67.3%, 78.2%]), with the remaining
27.0% of infections caused by rodents (95% credibility interval:
[21.8%, 32.7%]). Of the infections that came from human-to-
human transmission the model predicts that 17.5% come from
contact with infectious persons in the same household (95%
credibility interval: [11.8%, 23.6%]), with the majority of
82.5% coming from contact with infectious persons in the rest
of the village (95% credibility interval: [76.4%, 88.2%]). Trans-
mission from an infectious to a susceptible individual
happens at a rate (bH þ bV)/bV ¼ 56 times greater if the two
individuals are in the same household compared with if they
are not. This rate ratio was expected to be greater than one as
a consequence of increased contact rate within households,
and its high inferred value suggests that our model correctly
captured interhuman transmission.(e) Seasonality effect
The probability that each observed infection was caused by
rodents rather than interhuman transmission was plotted
over the course of the epidemic (figure 3). During the
colder months transmission from rodents played a relatively
larger role, and there is a possibility that human-to-human
transmission did not occur at all since the upper boundary
of the 99.5% credibility interval reaches one. On the other
hand, during the two peaks of the epidemic in October
1665 and June–August 1666 human-to-human transmission
is the cause of most infections. However, because the data
only span a year, it is not possible to conclude whether this
pattern repeats itself with the alternation of cold and warm
months.
To conclusively demonstrate a seasonality effect, it is
therefore necessary to test whether such a phase of mostly
rodent-driven transmission could happen in our model,
which assumes that the transmission parameters are the
same throughout the year and therefore does not account for
seasonality. To this end, the real data were compared withsimulated datasets using the same parameters as were inferred
for the real data, also known as a posterior predictive distri-
bution [51]. Although the simulated epidemics predict a
similar number of deaths overall to the number actually
observed, we find that the period during winter when very
few infections were observed in Eyam is slightly outside of
the simulated intervals (electronic supplementary material,
figure S3). This suggests that there is a seasonality effect in
the Eyam outbreak, consistent with general knowledge about
the plague [2]. The seasonality of plague is usually explained
by lower flea activity during colder months [19], but since
little human-to-human transmission was observed in the
winter (figure 3) an alternative or complementary explanation
may be reduced human interactions during the cold season.( f ) Infection risk factors
In order to test the effect of personal risk factors such as
wealth, sex and age, posterior predictive distributions were
constructed based on simulated epidemics using the same
parameters as inferred for the Eyam dataset. This technique
enables us to go beyond the properties of our model by cap-
turing features of the data that are significantly different from
the model expectation.
The question of whether household wealth affected the
likelihood of contracting plague was investigated by compar-
ing the observed proportion of plague victims that were from
wealthy houses (those listed as charged on the hearth tax reg-
ister) with the equivalent proportion from the simulated
epidemics. There is significant evidence ( p-value of less
than 0.001) to suggest that people in wealthy houses were
less likely to contract plague than those in poorer houses.
In Eyam, only 20.2% of plague victims came from houses
that appeared on the hearth tax register, whereas the simu-
lated epidemics suggest with 99.9% probability that if the
chances of contracting plague were independent of house-
hold wealth between 21.0 and 37.0% of the victims would
be from wealthy houses. The differential in infection rates
could perhaps be explained by better standards of cleanliness
in wealthier households leading to fewer rodents and fewer
human parasites, or, as has been suggested, by wealthier
families fleeing the plague [33].
There were slightly more men affected in the data relative
to women, and even though this was found to be not
% wealthy
de
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Figure 4. Histograms of proportion of plague victims that were (a) from wealthy households, (b) male and (c) under 18 years old male based on a thousand
simulated epidemics using model parameters taken from the posterior distribution. The dotted lines show equivalent proportions observed in the Eyam data. (Online
version in colour.)
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vious studies have reported such an association between
plague and men [52]. We therefore explored this hypothesis
again by comparing the observed proportion of plague vic-
tims that were male with the equivalent proportion from
the simulated epidemics. Figure 4 shows that there is not sig-
nificant evidence in the Eyam epidemic to suggest that men
were disproportionately more affected than women ( p ¼
0.088). In total, 51.7% of plague victims were male, which is
within the 99.9% posterior predictive interval [46.7%,
53.7%]. Previous analysis of the Eyam data has suggested
that age could be a significant determining factor in the epi-
demic, with a higher death toll observed among younger
adults compared with the very old or very young
[32,37,39]. We therefore explored the effect of age by compar-
ing the observed proportion of plague victims that were
under 18 at the start of the epidemic with the equivalent pro-
portion from the simulated epidemics. Figure 4 shows that
there is significant evidence in the Eyam epidemic to suggest
that children were disproportionately more affected than
adults. In total, 45.1% of plague victims were under 18
( p ¼ 0.010), which is significant; however, it is within the
99.9% posterior predictive interval [36.9%, 46.5%].3. Discussion
Detailed information for both victims and survivors of the
Eyam plague outbreak were combined with new epidemiolo-
gical models and statistical methods of analysis to provide
the most complete picture to date of the epidemiology of
this famous tragedy. We found evidence for both rodent-
to-human and human-to-human transmission routes, with
these two routes accounting, respectively, for a quarter and
three-quarters of all infection cases. It should be emphasized
that under the formulation of the model, human-to-human
transmission incorporates infection via vectors, such as the
human flea P. irritans [21] and the human louse [20], and
not only through aerosols caused by the relatively rare
form of pulmonary plague [2]. The likely route of plague
transmission varied over the course of the epidemic.
Rodent-only transmission cannot be excluded during thecolder months, as opposed to the two peaks of the epidemic
in October 1665 and in June–October 1666 during which
human-to-human transmission must have played a role in
the spread of the disease (figure 3). This observation,
combined with the fact that fewer cases occurred during
the winter than would be expected without a seasonality effect
(electronic supplementary material, figure S3), suggest a poss-
ible reduction in the rate of interhuman transmission during
the cold season, possibly in conjunction with diminished
rodent activity [19].
The role of the household structure was also found to be
highly significant, to the extent that an infectious individual
in the same household is almost 100 times more likely to trans-
mit to a susceptible host compared with an infectious person
living elsewhere in the village, which explains why so many
members of the same families died in close succession
[28,30,31] (figure 1). The presence of an infectious individual
within the household is therefore a very important risk factor
for contracting the disease. Gender was not an important
factor in the epidemic, but on the other hand household
wealth was confirmed to be an important determinant, with
richer villagers that were liable for the hearth tax much less
likely to die than poor villagers (figure 4). Adult age was also
found to reduce the risk of catching the disease, and these
two significantly protective factors could be interpreted in
terms of a reduced rate of interactions with other humans,
and therefore exposure to interhuman transmission. These
risk factors were investigated using posterior predictive tests,
and their effects were not included within the model.
The main limitation of the work presented here is that we
have been focusing solely on a single, relatively small out-
break of the plague, and therefore that any conclusion
drawn could be argued not to be necessarily representative
of the plague in general. There are two main reasons for
choosing the Eyam outbreak as a case study. First, exception-
ally detailed information has been gathered from several
historical documents by local historians [30,31,40] which
together allow a full depiction of the inhabitants of Eyam at
the time of the outbreak. Second, the conditions in which
the outbreak unfolded with little evidence for entry or exit
of individuals from the isolated village of Eyam, partly due
to the famous quarantine, which greatly simplifies attempts
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values of parameters such as the rate of rodent-to-human
transmission or the rate of human-to-human transmission
within and between households would probably be different
if they could be estimated for other outbreaks in other settings,
such as in the case of large urban epidemics such as the Great
Plague of London in 1664–1666 [53] or the Marseilles Plague
in 1720–1723 [54]. However, the mechanisms of spread are
likely to have been the same, even if their role may have
been different relative to one another. In particular, our results
feed into the long ongoing debate about the role of interhuman
transmission through human ectoparasites [21,24]. With the
plague still being endemic in several countries of Africa and
Latin America, this debate is not just of historical importance
but also of contemporary relevance to help deal with this
neglected tropical disease, which could someday become a
worldwide public health priority again [11].:201606184. Material and methods
(a) Model specification and notations
A stochastic SEIR model was adopted, taking into account the
household structure of the data as well as the underlying epi-
demic process of plague. Disease status was described in four
compartments: susceptible (S), latently infected (E), infectious
(I) and removed (R) (figure 2a). All mathematical notations
are summarized in the electronic supplementary material,
table S2.
Villagers are initially susceptible to the disease and infected
through contact with infected rodents or through contact with
infectious people in their household or in the village at large.
The model assumes that plague can be transmitted from
rodents to humans at a constant contact rate of bR, and that
human-to-human transmission can occur, most likely via ecto-
parasite vectors, or directly through aerosols in the case of
pneumonic plague. The contact rate with infected villagers is
assumed to be a constant bV/N, where N is the initial popu-
lation size [55]. To account for the observed household
structure of infection, an additional contact rate of bH/N is pro-
posed to allow for the higher probability of transmission from
infected members of the same household (figure 2b). Infected
individuals are not immediately infectious and first pass
through an exposed stage (E), at rate a per day before becom-
ing infectious. The infectious stage is defined as the period of
time during which infectious individuals can transmit the dis-
ease through contact with susceptibles. Finally, the infectious
individuals are removed from the population, through death
from plague, at rate g per day.
It is assumed that death from plague occurred on the day
prior to recorded burial, with exact times of death allocated to
ensure a unique ordering of events. In household h of size Nh,
the date of death from plague for person i [ f1, . . . , Nhg is
denoted ch,i. The times of infection with plague, and the times
when infected individuals become infectious themselves, are
unknown, and are denoted fh,i and nh,i, respectively. For those
villagers surviving the plague, we take ch,i ¼ fh,i ¼ nh,i ¼ 1.
Data augmentation [45] is used to calculate the times of infection
and becoming infectious, with the set of augmented data
denoted A ¼ fch,i, fh,i, nh,iji ¼ 1, . . . , Nh; h ¼ 1, . . . , Mg.
Define ShðtÞ ¼
PNh
i¼1 1ffh,i.tg, EhðtÞ ¼
PNh
i¼1 1ffh,i t , nh,ig, IhðtÞ ¼PNh
i¼1 1fnh,i t , ch,ig, RhðtÞ ¼
PNh
i¼1 1fch,i tg to be the number of suscep-
tible, latently infected, infectious and removed (i.e. dead) persons
in household h ¼ 1, . . . ,M at time t. Let SðtÞ ¼PMh¼1 ShðtÞ,
EðtÞ ¼PMh¼1 EhðtÞ, IðtÞ ¼PMh¼1 IhðtÞ, RðtÞ ¼PMh¼1 RhðtÞ and
N ¼ SðtÞ þ IðtÞ þ RðtÞ.(b) Likelihood derivation
Denoting the set of model parameters as Q ¼ fbH, bV, bR, a, gg,
the joint probability of the observed data D, augmented data A
and parameters is
P½D, A, Q ¼ P½DjAP½AjQP½Q, ð4:1Þ
where P½DjA, P½AjQ and P½Q are referred to as the observation,
transmission and prior levels, respectively [47].
The observation level of the model serves to ensure that the
augmented data A are consistent with the observed data D.
This is deemed to be the case when the period of infectiousness
(ph,i ¼ ch,i  nh,i) is shorter than the total period of infection
(fh,i ¼ ch,i  fh,i); and the total period of infection is less than
30 days, where the maximum infection period before death has
been chosen as a biologically realistic upper bound.
P½DjA ¼
YM
h¼1
YNh
i¼1
1fph,i  fh,ig1ffh,i , 30g: ð4:2Þ
The transmission level describes plague transmission within
each household, assuming the total infection and infectious
periods ffh,i, ph,ig are known. For household h, the instantaneous
rate of infection with plague at time t is
lI,hðtÞ ¼ bHIhðtÞ þ bVIðtÞN þ bR
 
ShðtÞ, ð4:3Þ
where bV is the transmission rate of infection with plague from
within the village; bH is the additional rate of infection with
plague from contact within the household and bR is the
transmission rate of infection due to contact with rodents.
The rate at which people in household h with latent infec-
tions become infectious is lE,h(t), where lE,h(t) ¼ aEh(t) and a
is the per-person rate of becoming infectious. Therefore,
lEðtÞ ¼
PM
h¼1 lE,hðtÞ is the rate of latently infected people
becoming infectious in the population as a whole.
The rate of death from plague in household h is denoted
lD,h(t), where lD,h(t) ¼ gIh(t) and g is the rate of death from
plague.
Let lIðtÞ ¼
PM
h¼1 lI,hðtÞ, lEðtÞ ¼
PM
h¼1 lE,hðtÞ and lDðtÞ ¼PM
h¼1 lD;hðtÞ be the rates of infection, becoming infectious and
death from plague in the population as a whole.
Let t be the time to the next event of either type I, E or D
in the population as a whole. Then t  Exp(l(t)), where
lðtÞ ¼ lIðtÞ þ lEðtÞ þ lDðtÞ.
If a total of T events happen over the course of the
epidemic, then let the times at which those events occur be
denoted t1, . . . , tT, where t0 ¼ 0 is the time at which the process
starts. Let ti ¼ ti 2 ti21 be the inter-event times. Further, let
ei [ fI, E, Rg for i ¼ 1, . . . , T be the observed events that occur,
and let h1, . . . ,hT be the households in which those events occur.
The probability of the augmented data given the parameters
is then
P½AjQ ¼
YT
i¼1
P½t ¼ tijQ, Dðti1ÞP½e ¼ ei, h ¼ hijti, Q
¼
YT
i¼1
lðti1Þelðti1Þti lei ,hi ðti1Þ
lðti1Þ
¼
YT
i¼1
lei ,hi ðti1Þelðti1Þti : ð4:4Þ
Uninformative prior distributions were assigned to the
model parameters, and it was assumed that for u [ Q;
uU½0, 100, so P[u ¼ x] ¼ 0.01.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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MCMC methods were used to estimate the model parameters
given epidemic data. A Markov chain was constructed such
that its stationary distribution was P½Q, AjD, the posterior distri-
bution of the model parameters and the augmented data given
the observed data. The chain was started with augmented data
that were consistent with the observed data. For each plague
victim i in household h the initial length of the infection period
fh,i was drawn from uniform distribution U[0, 30], and the
length of the infectious period, ph,i, was drawn from uniform dis-
tribution U[0, fh,i].
The sampler performs single-component Metropolis–
Hastings sampling. At each iteration, the algorithm proposes to
update the model parameters in the sequential order bH, bV,
bR, a and g; then proposes to update each infection duration
fh,i in turn, then finally proposes to update each duration of infec-
tious period ph,i in turn. The parameters and augmented data are
proposed from a normal distribution, with mean equal to the last
accepted sample value, and standard deviation chosen to ensure
efficient mixing of the Markov chain (electronic supplementary
material, table S3). Reflecting boundaries are specified for each
of the proposal distributions to ensure that the parameters and
augmented data are biologically plausible and consistent with
the observed data.
After a burn-in period of 5000 iterations, 20 000 iterations of
each model were performed and thinned by a factor of two to
obtain a sample of 10 000 values from the posterior distribution.
The convergence of the MCMC was assessed by examining trace
plots of the sampled parameters, and then confirmed using the
Gelman–Rubin criterion (GRC) [48]. Five chains with over-
dispersed starting parameters were run for eachmodel hypothesis.
The GRC was estimated for each parameter and for the log-likeli-
hood,withGRC, 1.1 being taken as confirmation of convergence.
(d) Model comparison, simulation and assessment
In order to determine whether human-to-human transmission
played a role in the Eyam epidemic—and, if so, to what extent
was household structure a determinant—we used Bayesian
model comparison [56]. First, we compared a model with no
human-to-human transmission (i.e. bH ¼ bV ¼ 0) versus a model
with no additional risk for transmission within the household
(i.e. bH ¼ 0). Second, we compared a model with no additionalrisk for transmission within the household (i.e. bH ¼ 0) versus
the full model described above. Each of these two comparisons
was performed using a reversible jump MCMC [49,50], which
was similar to the MCMC algorithm described above except for
the addition of reversible jumps proposing to set the relevant par-
ameter to zero and back. The validity of the reversible jump
algorithms was tested using simulated data, and in particular
when the smaller models were used for simulation, the smaller
models were correctly selected. However, application to the real
dataset always resulted in the larger of the two models being
used at every MCMC iteration. Since the proportion of sampling
from the compared models reflects the posterior odds ratio,
which is equal to the odds ratio times the Bayes factor, and that
the smaller models were not sampled even when the prior odds
ratio was increased up to 1010 in favour of the smaller models
[57,58], we conclude that the Bayes factor is greater than 1010 in
favour of the larger models for both comparisons.
In order to simulate data under our model, an epidemic
simulator was built as follows. Given the Eyam household struc-
ture and input parameters Q, the time until the first event was
drawn from an exponential distribution with parameter l(t).
The type of event to occur (i.e. an infection, becoming infectious
or a death) was determined by sampling e [ fI, E, Dg, where
P½ejQ, DðtÞ ¼ leðtÞ=lðtÞ. Finally, the household in which the
event occurred was determined by sampling h [ ð1, . . . , MÞ,
where P½hjQ, DðtÞ ¼ le,hðtÞ=leðtÞ. The state of the epidemic was
updated and the process repeated until no infected individuals
remained in the population and more than 350 days had elapsed.
Ten thousand epidemics were simulated using the same
household structure as Eyam and known parameters Q, drawn
from the posterior distribution derived from the Eyam epidemic,
in order to build the posterior predictive distributions [51]
required to test the effect of seasonality and personal risk factors.
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